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Expanding the Scope of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act:
Exchanging Foreign Debt for Sustainable Development
David M. Leon1
I am committed to using the Tropical Forest Conservation Act to
help countries redirect debt payments toward local projects that will
protect biodiversity and tropical forests.
President George W. Bush




In the past twenty years, two ostensibly separate yet ultimately
interdependent crises - government debt and environmental destruction
- have plagued much of the world. Environmental debt exchanges, or
"debt for nature" exchanges, offer a generally effective means of curbing
environmental destruction while paying off foreign national debt. This
comment will briefly delineate the various reasons, methods, and
mechanics for conducting such transactions, evaluate selected methods in
light of prevalent criticisms and concerns, then explore current trends
and possibilities for future innovations. Upon this analysis several points
come to light, among them the growing need to redirect the focus of
environmental debt exchanges to eliminate the root causes of poverty and
environmental degradation.
I. Origins, Definitions, and Dynamics of Environmental Debt
Exchanges
Mexico and Brazil began the global debt trend in 1982,
announcing that they would be unable to repay the entirety of their
foreign debt as normally scheduled.2 By 1990 the total external debt
accumulated by all debtor countries hit US $ 1,319,000,000,000.? To
stave off bankruptcy, many debtor nations resorted to plundering their
own natural resources through logging, ranching, and raising annual cash
1 B.A., University of California at Berkeley; J.D. (May 2003), University of
Miami School of Law.
2 See Morris Miller, DEBT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONVERGING CRISES, at 9
(1991) [hereinafter Miller].
.Id. at 11.
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crops for export.4 The benefits of these practices proved to be short-term
and localized. By contrast, the costs of mining, logging, ranching, and
farming tropical rainforests involve long-term global losses 5 Between
1980 and 1995, 540 million acres of tropical forest were cut down,6
contributing to higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The
destruction of forests also deprives the world community of valuable
resources, including medicines and organic genetic materials used for
agriculture.8
In 1984 Dr. Thomas Lovejoy, then vice-president of the World
Wildlife Fund ("WWF"), proposed the "debt-for-nature" exchange as a
means of lowering international debt while reducing environmental
destruction.9
The entire exchange process hinges on the high likelihood that
the debtor nation would never pay its debts at all. Faced with such a
prospect, the creditor is far more willing to sell the "bad" debt at a
discount to recoup at least a fraction of its original investment. In the
classic debt-for-nature model, a non-governmental conservation
organization ("NGO") purchases foreign-currency denominated debt of
the debtor country in the international debt market at a substantial
discount. The NGO presents the debt to the central bank of the debtor
country for redemption in local currency. The debt is officially retired
and the NGO uses the local currency proceeds to fund environmental
projects in the debtor country.
10
In other words, if a country owed a bad debt of $10 million, an
NGO could purchase that debt in the secondary market for $5 million,
then sell it back to the same debtor country for $7 million. Thus, "the
4 See Diana J. Eitman, Maintaining Sovereignty and the Tropical Rainforests:
The Promise of Debt for Nature Swaps, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 29,
31-34 (2001) [hereinafter Eitman].
5 See Roger W. Findley, Legal and Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Use
of Rainforests, 32 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 17, 19-20 (1997) [hereinafter Findley].
6 USAID, USAID and the Environment: What We Do: Why Protect Forests
through 'Debt-for-Nature' Swaps?,
available at http://www.usaid.gov/environment/whyprotectforests.html.
7 Carbon dioxide contributes to the "greenhouse effect." See INTERGOV'T
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT (1995).
8Eitman, supra note 4, at 20.
9 See Thomas E. Lovejoy, Aid Debtor Nation's Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1984 at A3 1 [hereinafter Lovejoy].
10 Rosanne Model, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Environmental Investments Using
Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for Expropriation, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1195, 1197 (1991).
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developing country has reduced its debt, the [creditor] has reduced its
liability, . . the [NGO] has made a profit,'4 l and the cause of
environmental conservation is furthered.
The basic debt-for-nature model has evolved on several levels.
For example, the identity and number of the parties may vary. In three-
party debt exchanges, an NGO solicits debt donations or purchases
reduced-value debt from a creditor on the secondary debt market. The
NGO then negotiates conservation arrangements with debtor country. In
bilateral exchanges the creditor and the debtor country negotiate directly.
Early environmental debt exchanges relied heavily on international
NGO's, but recently creditor nations have developed domestic legislation
facilitating bilateral debt exchanges with debtor countries.12 Since 1989
Holland, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States have
each independently financed debt-for-nature exchanges.
13
Once the parties negotiate the underlying agreement, different
organizations can implement the conservation measures within the debtor
country. Sometimes the conservation measures are carried out by
agencies specially created by the debtor country for that purpose, or by
international NGO's operating within the debtor country, or by NGO's
operating under the laws of the debtor country. 4
The form of the debt may also vary. The debt may be
commercial debt owed to private lending institutions such as commercial
banks. The debt may be trade debt owed to foreign exporters. 5 It may
be bilateral debt owed to a creditor nation. Or it may be multilateral debt
owed to an international or regional multilateral lending institution'
6
Finally, the ends sought by the parties can vary. The term "debt-
for-nature" has been used to refer generically to three distinct types of
" Eitman, supra note 4, at 43.
12 See, e.g., Tropical Forest Conservation Act, 22 U.S.C. §2431 (1998).
13 See Amanda Lewis, The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature, 10
COL. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 431, 441-45 (1999).
14 For example, in a 1987 debt-for-nature transaction between the Nature
Conservancy, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ecuador, the proceeds were used to
establish and fund Fundacion Natura, an Ecuadorian NGO. See id. at 437.
Poland has established a government-managed "Ecofund" to manage its debt-
for-nature projects. Id. at 443.
15 For example, in 1990, the Central Bank of Madagascar exchanged foreign
export debt with Conservation International in a debt-for-nature transaction. Id
at 439.
16 For example, the Paris Club, an association of seventeen nations including the
United States, Brazil, Canada, and Japan, forgave approximately US $16.5
billion in Polish debt. Id. at 442-43.
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transactions. A better generic term is "environmental debt exchange" or
"EDE." 17 In true "debt-for-nature" transactions, "the NGO utilizes the
local currency funds to finance environmental projects such as pollution
studies or waste treatment facilities."18 In "debt-for-land" transactions,
the parties preserve ecologically sensitive areas - often tropical rain
forests - through zoning or creation of national parks. Almost all debt
for land transactions involve a "debt-for-nature" component to fund
research or training programs necessary for land preservation. Finally,
the "debt-for-equity" exchange involves the creditor or NGO acquiring
title to debtor country assets including land, natural resources, or
industrial facilities.
m. An Evaluation of the Issues
By the late 1980's, EDE's had been used to retire over one
trillion dollars of foreign national debt.19 Innovations in environmental
debt exchanges met with varying success depending on the interface of
the selected methods with the particular issues arising from the debtor
countries' social, political, and environmental landscapes. For example,
debt for land exchanges proved more suitable to agricultural economies,
debt for nature programs proved most helpful in mitigating pollution, and
debt for equity proved most suited to unproductive industrialized
economies.2 However, EDE's are not without their difficulties.
A. Pre-Exchange Barriers
Some difficulties surface before any exchange has been made.
One barrier to transacting debt exchanges involves the lack of bad debt in
needy countries. Because debt exchanges are possible only through
creditor's expectations of non-payment, when debtor nations service
their foreign debts, those debts are not likely to be discounted on the
secondary market and environmental debt exchanges are less likely to
17 See Nicolas M. Kublicki, Green Finance: Problems and Solutions Concerning
Alternative Environmental Debt Exchanges, 18 VT. L. REv. 313, 316-319
(1994) [hereinafter Kublicki]. Mr. Kublicki prefers the term "alternative
environmental debt exchange" or "AEDE" to refer to foreign debt exchanges for
environmental improvement. However, the term "environmental debt exchange"
is more accurate, because while it is true that these exchanges are strictly
"alternatives" to the regular payment of the debt, the debts at issue are "bad
debts" that will never be paid.
" Id at 317.
19 Id. at 315. However, the debt retired represents only .05% of existing external
national debt and .2% of existing commercial debt. Id. at 336, n. 110.201 Id. at 325.
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occur. 1 It can be argued that conventional foreign assistance would
suffice for these nations. While conventional foreign assistance may be
cheaper and less risky for the creditor nations and institutions,
environmental debt exchanges present a greater likelihood that the
conservation measures will actually succeed. Precisely because debt
exchanges are more costly and risky, creditors will be more likely to
squeeze environmental benefits out of the transaction to fulfill their
investment.
22
Another barrier involves political climate. Political instability in
the debtor country may prevent effective decision-making and furnish a
lack of support for the debtor country's leaders. There may also be a
lack of political will in creditor entities to partake in environmental debt
exchanges due to the possibility of a harsh budgetary impact. Finally,
the debtor nation may lack the necessary fiscal resources to transact an
exchange requiring national implementation funding. Parties can work
around this problem by structuring debt for land or debt for equity
exchanges requiring less local funding.
B. Post-Exchange Difficulties
Once an exchange occurs, several points of concern arise. The
most prevalent difficulties include preserving debtor countries' national
sovereignty, respecting indigenous sovereignty, avoiding inflation, and
enforcing the terms of the exchanges.
1. National Sovereignty
As with many areas of international law, national sovereignty
continually surfaces as a primary concern in EDE's. "Sovereignty"
connotes nations' freedom from control by other nations, subject to
international law. The United Nations has passed several resolutions
since the 1950's explicitly stating that nations have the right to
sovereignty over their own natural resources.23 Debt for equity and debt
21 Botswana, Eritrea, Gambia, Namibia, and Swaziland regularly pay their debts
but are suffering from desertification. See Debt-for-Environment Swaps for
National Desertification Funds, at http://www.undp.org/seed/unso/pub-
htm/swap-engl .htm.
22 Suffice to say this comment operates on the assumption that when creditor
nations and organizations commit to foreign aid, those entities do not desire a
monetary return on investment so much as a concomitant improvement in the
quality of life in the debtor nation.
23 See, e.g., G.A. Res 523, U.N. GAOR 6th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/2119 (1952); G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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for land exchanges produce serious sovereignty concerns because
creditors take title to debtor country property or exercise control over
debtor country land use.
Despite inescapable foreign ownership of debtor country assets
in debt for equity exchanges, such transactions do not infringe on
national sovereignty to the degree once feared. Although debtor
countries cede property to creditors in debt for equity transactions, the
same outflow of currency would take place were the debtor country to
pay its debt as scheduled.24 Furthermore, economic benefits are likely to
accrue to the debtor country if the creditor's operation of industrial or
agricultural businesses requires a local workforce.25 In any event, all
such businesses are subject to the debtor country's tax regime, and thus
contribute to the debtor country's sovereign revenue
26
To assuage residual concerns regarding sovereignty, a portion of
foreign businesses' profits may be restricted to the debtor country's
domestic economy. Brazil and Chile have both initiated measures
restricting the repatriation of debt for equity profits. 27 Debt for equity
exchanges can also create long-term leases instead of transferring title.
The leases would end whenever the creditor recovered the debt, and all
the while the debtor country would maintain title to the property.
Debt for land exchanges also raise sovereignty concerns because
such transactions effectively operate as perpetual zoning regulations.
Any attempt by the debtor country to use the land for any other purpose
constitutes a material breach of the agreement. Resentment has
developed within debtor countries for creditors who dictate debtor
country land use law. However, those harboring such resentment might
bear in mind that debt for land exchanges are not mandatory, nor are they
generally secured by coercion in a conventional sense.28  These
environmental debt exchanges are in fact the product of the debtor
country's consent. Sovereignty provisions may nevertheless occupy a
greater role in the structuring of the debt for land transaction if the
parties agree that debtor country representatives shall sit on the decision-
making panel regulating the use of proceeds from the transaction.
24 See Kublicki, supra note 17, at 327-29.
25 See id.
26 see id.
27 Id. at 320, n. 83.
28 Claims of "economic coercion" against creditors have been explored and
rebutted based on debtor nation acceptance of the terms of EDE's. See Priya
Alagiri, Give Us Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries' Perspective




Similarly, debtor country representatives may also occupy
positions on the panels regulating debt-for-nature programs, which
constitute a lesser threat to debtor country sovereignty than debt-for-
equity or debt-for-land exchanges. Balancing such decision-making and
regulatory panels presents an added layer of difficulty because for every
debtor country representative on the panel to protect sovereignty, one
less creditor or NGO representative sits on the panel to enforce the terms
of the agreement. Thus, to some degree sovereignty concerns clash with
enforcement concerns.
2. Indigenous Sovereignty
Indigenous sovereignty concerns first arose in 1987 when
Conservation International ("CI") failed to consult with 25,000 Moxo
Indians living in Bolivia's Chimanes Forest before transacting a debt for
land exchange. The Moxo were in the process of seeking title to the land
when CI completed the transaction. Under Cl's "conservation" regime,
the Moxo could not sustain their prior existence.
29
The Moxo debacle remains an early and extreme example of
creditor and NGO disregard for indigenous populations. However there
remains a lingering danger that parties to an EDE may ignore the
lifestyles of debtor country residents in favor of a "deep ecology"
approach that values nature for its own sake, many times to the detriment
of human quality-of-life. 30 The profusion of EDE's in the last 15 years
has been weighted heavily in favor of creating nature preserves and
parks. Even where such EDE's succeed in incorporating the indigenous
population, 31 the benefits of past EDE's to local populations have been
scant at best.
In fact, local sentiment towards park preservation efforts can turn
violent. In 1994, the head warden of Tayrona National Park in Northern
Colombia was murdered, the sixth park officer killed in twenty years.
32
After these killings, illegal settlers planted crops, hunted, cut down trees,
and prospected for gold in the park. Local officials illegally gave deeds
to these settlers, and eventually private parties owned 80% of the park.
33
To prevent resentment developing within local populations, those groups
29 See id. at 499-500.
30 See A. Dan Tarlock, Earth and Other Ethics: The Institutional Issues, 56
TENN. L. REv. 43, 60 (1988).
31 For example, USAID's debt-for-land swap with the Philippines in 1991
incorporated indigenous people as park rangers. Alagiri, supra note 28, at 505.
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who will be affected by a debt for land transaction should have some
seat(s) on any decision making board.
The Tropical Forest Conservation Act authorizes United States
funding EDE's that "support ... the livelihoods of individuals living in or
near a tropical forest in a manner consistent with protecting such tropical
forests." 4 Taken in broad perspective, this provision proves the most
essential element of any EDE. Whatever benefits forest conservation
presents to creditors, EDE's invariably affect local populations. Those
local populations more often than not determine the fate of the ecosystem
in which they live. If the roots of environmental destruction are to be
properly addressed, EDE's must not only preserve flora and fauna, but
also improve the indigenous population's quality of life.
3. Enforceability
The problem of how to enforce an EDE instrument should a
breach occur has provided inspiration for academic debate,35 but the
problem has never manifested itself in practice.36 The incentives not to
breach are so strong that it is unlikely that EDE breaches will ever
present as serious a problem as once thought. Nevertheless, it remains
unclear how exactly the parties' rights should be protected in the event of
a breach. While the incentives to adhere to the agreement definitely exist
on the macro-level, individual corruption within debtor countries and
creditor entities remains a live issue.
Generally, EDE's are signed in the debtor country.37 Thus the
most obvious forum for an action on the EDE instrument would be a
debtor country tribunal, especially in the case of an individual
appropriating funds from within the debtor country. Regarding a breach
on a national level, however, the debtor country may adhere to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which would require the country's
unlikely consent to be sued. Legal action brought in an international
tribunal against a debtor country would also require the consent of both
the debtor and the creditor, and international courts lack viable
enforcement mechanisms to effectuate judgments against non-
cooperative parties. Bringing an action in another tribunal - such as the
courts of the country in which the creditor or NGO is based - is another
option.
14 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(g) (2002).
35 Lovejoy, supra note 9.
36 Kublicki, supra note 17 at 343.
37 Id. at 342.
VOL. I11
DEBT-FOR-NATURE
In the event of a material breach of the EDE instrument by the
debtor country, the structure of bilateral debt for equity exchanges
provide the creditor with a means of recourse. Specifically, the creditor
can refuse to cancel the amount of debt the parties agreed upon. This
option is unavailable in multilateral transactions because the creditor
would have already forgiven the debt.
The best mechanism for addressing EDE breaches in debt-for-
nature and debt-for-land transactions involves negotiating for the seating
of a balanced administrative panel to oversee the transaction from
beginning to end. For example, as early as 1989, in a debt-for-land
transaction between Holland and Costa Rica, either government was
authorized to suspend a conservation project's funding and inspect the
reforestation fund's accounts and projects. And in the massive
transaction between the Paris Club and Poland in1991 both Polish and
Paris Club member nation representatives were appointed to Poland's
Ecofund Steering Committee. However, enforceability measures can
clash with sovereignty concerns. For every foreign member of an
administrative board, there is one less debtor country national and one
more degree of local control lost.
4. Inflation and Other Economic Concerns
The capital inflow generated by environmental debt exchanges
can lead to inflation because one of the easiest ways to create inflation is
to simply print more money. Theoretically, if enough cash generated by
an EDE were simply dumped into the debtor country economy via
conservation efforts, prices would rise not only for the commodities upon
which the debtor country citizens depend, but also for the items that the
EDE needs to operate.
Yet serious inflation has never resulted from an EDE, possibly
because no EDE has generated enough currency to impact the overall
economy of a debtor nation.38 However, the debt for nature program
consummated in 1994 between UNICEF and Senegal encountered initial
problems resulting from devaluation of the Senegalese currency. In
December 1993, UNICEF purchased for US $6 million US $24 million
worth of bilateral and commercial debt Senegal owed to Argentina.
39
The Senegalese government agreed to pay UNICEF the equivalent of US
381 Id. at 333.
39 James P. Resor, Debt for Environment Swaps for National Desertification
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$11 million in Senegalese Francs over three years to support health,
sanitation, and water projects in Senegal. But one month later in January
1994, the Senegalese Franc was devalued by 50% and because
Senegalese payments were linked to the dollar, the devaluation doubled
the Senegalese payment obligation. The parties renegotiated the
payment period to four years, and redefined the payments in terms of
Senegalese Francs.
40
When structuring the EDE, parties should take inflation into
account, even if only in terms of the debtor country's domestic inflation
rate. NGO's have two main options when releasing EDE funds. The
money can be released in a lump sum or in the form of bonds. Bonds are
the preferred mechanism to shield the funds from inflation.41 If released
in bonds, the interest on the bonds should be linked to the inflation rate
to keep the bonds' value steady. For example, assume a $1000 bond
issued in 2000 pays 10% per annum, and the inflation rate of the debtor
nation is also 10%. In 2000, the interest on the bond is $100, but in 2001
the bond is only worth $900 (in 2000 dollars), so the interest on the bond
drops to $90. However, if the interest rate on the bond were added or
"linked" to the inflation rate, the interest rate would stand at 20%. Thus,
the interest in 2001 on the same devalued $900 bond would be $110 (in
2000 dollars).
Inflation affects different types of EDE's proportionally to the
amount of local currency needed for the EDE. Debt-for-nature programs
are most susceptible to problems resulting from inflation because local
currency is needed to implement training and management programs.
Debt-for-land involves less expenditure of local currency; debt-for-
equity exchanges do not depend on local currency at all, and thus enjoy
better insulation from inflation concerns.
However, debt-for-equity exchanges are subject to asset
valuation difficulties. Because debtor country debt is owed by the debtor
country's government, government assets are transferred to the creditor.
These assets lack proper market valuation because state-owned assets are
generally of a type not traded on the free market, which would otherwise
assign value based on supply and demand. This problem is especially
severe in former communist states where the state owned all means of
production and the free market has not taken sufficient hold to dictate
market values of state property.
42
40 id.
41 Kublicki, supra note 17, at 333, n. 104.
42 See id. at 340.
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Thus, the value of state assets in debt-for-equity exchanges must
be resolved by negotiation. Specific criteria may assist in guiding these
negotiations. If the asset is a physical commercial facility, the price can
be determined by the construction costs minus any depreciation 3 If the
asset is a natural resource, the price can be determined by commodity
pricing in the debtor country's own market.44 And if the debt for equity
exchange is structured as a long-term lease, the value can be set by how
much benefit the creditor derives from it.45 A long-term lease allows for
the greatest efficiency because asset valuation by the commodity pricing
and cost-depreciation methods leaves open the possibility that a forest
worth $1 million in timber exchanged in 2001 would increase or
decrease substantially in value before the creditor can realize the exact
payment of the debt amount. By keeping up-to-date financial records on
a long-term lease venture, the debt amount can be paid exactly over time.
IV. Shifting the Focus of EDE's to Improve Quality of Life
EDE's are not an end in themselves, but rather a means of
achieving specified ends.46 Improving EDE's involves seeking sources
and mechanisms geared toward specific goals to further the debtor
country's community incentive to develop sustainably, and the global
community's interests in recouping loans.
The first wave of enthusiasm and opportunity for EDE's passed
in the 1980's and early 1990's. More recently, several factors have
decreased opportunities for future EDE's. First, some debtor countries,
including the Philippines and Mexico, have restructured their external
debt. Such restructuring permits regular servicing of the debts, and lifts
those nations from the realm of countries whose debt has devalued to the
point that creditors are willing to sell at sufficient discountsto legitimate
an EDE. Also, EDE feasibility ultimately depends on creditor
institutions' willingness to allocate foreign assistance. In times of
shrinking national foreign aid budgets47 EDE's are unappealing because
43 See id at 340-41.
44 See id.
41 See id.
46 See James P. Resor, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A Decade of Experience and
New Directions for the Future (1997), at
http://www.fao.org./docrep/w3247e/w3247e06.htm [hereinafter Resor].
47 "According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee ("DAC")
'official development assistance (ODA) from DAC members in 1997 fell to ... a
record low of 0.22% of DAC members' collective GNP' in 1997. More
recently, however, at a UN Convention in Monterrey, Mexico, wealthy
industrialized nations have promised increased foreign aid assistance.
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of their cost. And when international, political or financial crises grasp
popular attention, EDE's can be easily forgotten.
Nevertheless, EDE's continued to develop and flourish after a
lull in the mid-1990's. Many new EDE's have been structured to create
environmental funds, which, if managed well, can generate independent
funding for long-term environmental health. The United States' Tropical
Forest Conservation Act ("TFCA") represents new legislation that uses
the "fund" method. The TFCA also neutralizes former concerns
regarding sovereignty and enforcement. Multilateral lending institutions
represent a possible new source of EDE funding. And programs such as
emissions trading and land reform present admirable goals for future
EDE's.
A. Environmental Funds
In 1993, the Philippine and American governments and the
WWF adopted the idea that EDE's, once transacted, could eventually
fund themselves in perpetuity if managed properly. Thus began the
Foundation for the Philippine Environment ("FPE"), a capitalized NGO
with a $26 million endowment initially funded by two bilateral EDE's
between the United States and the Philippines. FPE's endowment is the
largest of its kind in the world.48 FPE's board of trustees incorporates
representatives from Philippine development and conservation
organizations, government agencies, the Philippine business community,
academia, and international conservation organizations 49 Similar trust
funds have been established in Colombia, Belize and Uganda 50
In 1988 the Global Environment Facility (GEF) reported that the
number of operative funds increased from twenty-one in 1994 to forty-
six in 1997, mostly in Latin America and the Caribbean."1 By 2000, at
least eleven more funds were forming and some forty-five more had been
proposed.52
While environmental fund structure and operation differs
according to several variables including the laws of the beneficiary
nation and the mandates of the fund source, three general types of funds
48 See Resor, supra note 46.
49 id.
50 See id.
51 See GLOBAL ENvT. FACILITY, EXPERIENCE WITH CONSERVATION TRUST
FUNDS, EVALUATION REPORT NO. 1- 99 (1999) [hereinafter Global Envt.
Facility].
52 See Ricardo Bayon, Carolyn Deere, Ruth Norris, and Scott E. Smith,
Environmental Funds: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects, at
http://economics.iucn.org/pdf/topics- 18-01.pdf (2002) [hereinafter Bayon et al.].
VOL. I I
DEBT-FOR-NATURE
have been recognized. The first type of fund - the national
environmental fund - supports a wide variety of endeavors according to
a national environmental plan or strategy. Such funds have been
established in Bhutan and Bolivia.53 The second type of fund supports
the conservation and management of specific geographical areas,
whether individual parks or entire park systems. This type of "park"
fund exists in Uganda, Peru, and Jamaica.5 4 The final type of fund
involves making grants to NGO's and community groups for
conservation projects. "Grant" funds, provided for in the TFCA,
55
operate in Brazil and the Philippines.56 Most operating funds are either
park funds or grant funds.57
The legal structure of environmental funds depends upon the
laws of the beneficiary country. In common law countries the funds are
known as "trusts" and in civil law countries the funds are known as
"foundations."58 Many funds have attained non-profit corporation status.
Some have been established by an act of the national legislature. 9 Funds
may incorporate one or more financial structures within their overall
operation. Endowments invest capital and use money generated by their
investments to finance activities, while sinking funds distribute all capital
and investment income over a predetermined time period, and revolving
funds replenish their original capital with new funding.60 EDE's provide
the most common source of financing for environmental funds.
61
If managed effectively, environmental funds can be effective
long-term financing tools for conservation and sustainable development
efforts. By combining the public sector and various segments of the
private sector,62 environmental funds strengthen each sector individually
53 Id.
54 id.
5 See 22 U.S.C. § 2431(h): "Each beneficiary country ... shall establish a
Tropical Forest Fund"; §2431(g): "Grants from a fund shall be made to
nongovernmental environmental, forestry, conservation, and indigenous peoples
organizations."





62 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2431g ("the administering body shall consist of one or
more individuals appointed by the United States Government; one or more
individuals appointed by the government of the beneficiary country; and
individuals who represent a broad range of environmental nongovernmental
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and foster an atmosphere of cooperation and trust by decentralizing
decision-making. If properly balanced, pluralistic fund management can
also reinforce debtor country sovereignty while ensuring enforcement.
However, such funds can also constrict scarce capital and generate little
income, while increasing the bureaucracy between beneficiary countries
63and financing organizations. And many funds need to spend resources
on improving their own management, implementing monitoring and
accounting systems, and helping local NGO's and community
organizations write grant proposals and attain implementation skills.
64
To be effective, environmental funds should be established for
long-term environmental projects requiring significant amounts of
money for implementation. If the project is minor, or if it needs to be
implemented quickly, environmental funds may not be appropriate. The
debtor country government must support power-sharing with the private
66sector. Diverse elements of the private sector must cooperate, and the
debtor country's legal and financial regimes must be strong and
developed enough to support the funds. 67
B. Developments in United States Legislation
As recently as October 16, 2001, the United States House of
Representatives approved $10 million in annual appropriations for coral
reef conservation through EDE's for fiscal years 2002 to 2005 .68 The
organizations of, or active in the beneficiary country; local community
development nongovernmental organizations of the beneficiary country; and
scientific, academic, or forestry organizations of the beneficiary country").
63 See generally Ilya Shapiro, 'Green' Bill a Lesson in Big Government, Small
Benefits, THE DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Oct. 1, 1998, available at
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/Content/1998/10/01/edits/column 1.html
hereinafter Shapiro].




68 See Coral Reef and Coastal Conservation Act: Hearings on H.2272 before the
House (2001), available at
http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/coralhousedebatel0160l.html. The act seeks to
protect coral reefs through "debt-for-nature swaps, debt buybacks, or debt
restructuring instruments." During the House debate, it was noted that "half a
billion people, eight percent of the world's population, live within one hundred
kilometers of a coral reef' and "coral reefs provide fisheries for food and raw
materials for new medicines and pharmaceuticals. Tourism and recreation
flourish along coral reef tracts and provide jobs and real income for coastal
residents. They also provide shore protection, shielding coastal communities
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Coral Reef and Coastal Marine Conservation Act of 2001 was modeled
on the TFCA.69 "The TFCA authorizes the President to reduce certain
bilateral government debt owed to the United States under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1981 or Title 1 of the Agricultural Trade and
Development and Assistance Act of 1954. "70 In exchange for the
reduction in bilateral debt, the beneficiary debtor country establishes a
"Tropical Forest Fund"71 to accumulate and disperse local currency for
the benefit of the nation's tropical forests. 72
The TFCA expands upon earlier legislation to facilitate more
effective EDE's. For example, more nations are eligible for EDE's
under the TFCA. Under the previous EDE legislation, the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative of 1991 ("EAI"),73 only Latin American and
Caribbean nations qualified for debt-for-nature transactions. However,
the TFCA did adopt some of the other eligibility requirements under the
EAI, and added certain new restrictions. As in EAI transactions, "the
government [of the debtor country] must be democratically elected, must
not support acts of international terrorism, must cooperate on
international narcotics control matters, must not violate internationally
recognized human rights, and must institute any needed investment
and harbors from violent storms and erosion." The bill passed by a 382 to 32
vote, with 16 members not voting. Countries such as "Jamaica, Belize, the
Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and Thailand could benefit from this
legislation." California representative Tom Lantos stated "[iut speaks to the
strength of this body and this nation that in the midst of a war we take time to
pass important environmental legislation."
69 22 U.S.C. § 243 l(g)(2)(A) (1998).
70 United States Mission to the European Union, Biden Bill to Reauthorize
Tropical Forest Conservation Act (June 12, 2001), at
http://www.useu.be/Categories/Environment/EnvTropRainForrest 12June01.html
71 See 22 U.S.C. § 243 lh ("Each beneficiary country ... shall be required to
establish a Tropical Forest Fund.").
72 See 22 U.S.C. § 2431g ("Grants from a fund shall be made to (A)
nongovernmental environmental, forestry, conservation, and indigenous peoples
organizations of, or active in the beneficiary country; or... (C) in exceptional
circumstances, the government of the beneficiary country.").
" 7 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Under the EAI, the United States forgave 53.8% of
the $1626.3 million in debt owed by Latin American nations. See supra note 46.
Since 1996, debt-for-nature transactions under EAI and TFCA have improved
the management of over 1,103,198 hectares of natural forest and tree systems
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reforms., 74 However, the TFCA elaborates on the last criterion by
requiring that the debtor country "put in place major investment reforms,
as evidenced by the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty with the
United States, implementation of an investment sector loan with the
Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank-supported investment
reforms, or other measures, as appropriate." 75  These eligibility
requirements address the United States' enforceability concerns by
targeting beneficiary nations that can show certain types of guarantees of
accountability and trustworthiness.
The TFCA also provides for an administrative body in every
beneficiary country to control fund disbursements. These bodies shall
include (1) United States government officials, (2) beneficiary country
government officials, and (3) representatives from beneficiary country
organizations concerned with the environment, community development,
science, academia, and forestry.76 The majority of the members must
come from the third category.7 7 However, the United States government
retains a high degree of control, especially over large projects. First, the
president selects eligible nations for an EDE under the TFCA, 8 (the
Secretary of State is authorized to enter into specific agreements with
debtor nations79), fifteen presidentially-appointed board members
oversee TFCA activities worldwide,8 0 and most importantly, "[a]ny grant
of more than $100,000 from a Fund shall be subject to veto by the
Government of the United States.""
A major problem with the TFCA is that Congress unnecessarily
limited it to "developing countr[ies] with [] tropical forest[s].
'8 2
Countries lacking "tropical forests" will have to depend on independent
legislation such as the Coral Reef Act. To streamline the process, the
TFCA should be amended to apply to countries even if those countries
lack a tropical forest. A more appropriate designation would target
biodiversity "hotspots," areas of the globe that support the most life per
acre.8 3 Such an amendment would obviate the need to use congressional
time passing new bills for every distinct ecosystem.
14 22 U.S.C. § 2431.
" 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(c).76 See 22 U.S.C. § 2431.
77 See 22 U.S.C. §243 1(g).78 See 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(c).
79 See 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(g).80 See supra note 5.
"' 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(g).
12 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(c)(emphasis added).
83 For further elaboration on hotspots, see
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Of course, broadening the eligibility requirements for the TFCA
may necessitate increased funding.84 Congress has authorized increased
spending, but the current presidential administration did not allocate the
full amount of funding authorized for fiscal year 2002, allocating only
US $30 million for fiscal year 2002.85 Under recent amendments to the
TFCA, the president was authorized to spend up to $50 million on TFCA
activities in 2002.86 This gap leaves room for the $10 million in annual
Coral Reef Act allocations with $10 million to spare.
TFCA activities currently include sustainable harvesting
programs in Indonesia, Brazil, Guyana, Belize, and Bangladesh.87  In
March 2000, President Clinton allocated up to $6 million for an EDE in
Bangladesh.88 In July 1998, the Bangladesh transaction was the first
authorized under the TFCA.8 9  The transaction is geared to improve
environmental management of the world's largest mangrove forest.
Known as the Sunderbans, this forest covers Bangladesh's southwest
region and houses one of the world's largest populations of the highly
endangered Bengal tiger.
90
USAID, the agency authorized to implement TFCA transactions,
has taken a broad approach to applying the Bangladesh Tropical Forest
Conservation Foundation's funds. The overall goal of USAID's program
in Bangladesh involves "strengthen[ing] the ability of the government of
Bangladesh and the local non-governmental organizations (NGO's)
working in this area to improve environmental and natural resources
management. ''91 USAID has taken the approach referred to in the
www.conservation.org/xp/CIWEB/strategies/hotspots.xml.
84 22 U.S.C. § 2431(d) authorized US $25 million for 1999, $75 million for
2000, and $100 million for 2001.
85 U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: US. Tropical Forest Conservation Act (April
21, 2001), at http://usinfo.state.gov/tropical/global/environ/0 1042112.htm.
86 The Senate recently passed S.1021, which authorizes $50 million for 2002,
$75 million for 2003, and $100 million for 2004. 22 U.S.C. § 2431 (1998). See
Senate Approves Lugar's Tropical Forest Conservation Act (July 24, 2001), at
http://www.senate.gov/-lugar/072401 a.html.
87 See Budget Justification, supra note 73; The Nature Conservancy, Landmark
Deal to Protect Rainforests in Belize (Aug. 2, 2001), available at
http://nature.org/aboutus/press/press326.html.
88 World Wildlife Fund, WWF Applauds US. Debt-For-Nature Swap in
Bangladesh (March 20, 2000),
available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/news/headline.cfin?newsid= 113.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See USAID, Bangladesh, at http://www.usaid.gov/bd/Environment.html
[hereinafter USAID, Bangladesh].
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"Eligible Activities" subsection of the TFCA, which provides for fund
disbursements to "conserve, maintain, and restore the tropical forests in
the beneficiary country, through ...development and support of the
livelihoods of individuals living in or near a tropical forest.' USAID's
approach seeks "integrated management" by viewing ecosystems as
"includ[ing] human use, [and] living patterns." One program USAID
implemented in the Bangladesh transaction, the Management of Aquatic
Ecosystems through Community Husbandry ("MACH"), aims to
increase household income and food security through environmentally
sound management of floodplain resources.93 USAID also seeks to
implement programs to increase energy efficiency, including using clean
fuels, reducing system loss, and installing photovoltaic solar energy
panels. 94 USAID has also contracted with the United States Forest
Service to provide technical assistance to other national governments to
prevent forest fires so that "farmers and forest managers will profit from
investments made by USAID. 95  This approach addresses the root
causes of environmental degradation in ways earlier transactions have
not. These new EDE's improve upon past EDE's by focusing on
improved human lifestyles as an integral element in ecosystemic health.
Belize also transacted an environmental debt exchange with the
United States under the TFCA. In August 2001, the United States agreed
to forgive US $1.4 million in Belizean bilateral debt in exchange for the
protection of 23,000 acres of forest, including 16 miles of coastline.
96
The transaction will cut Belize's debt to the United States by one half. 7
Belize will issue $7.2 million in local currency payable to Belizean
NGO's, which will establish endowment funds to manage the protected
lands. In a related agreement, The Nature Conservancy will provide
$800,000 to the United States government to fund the transaction. The
Nature Conservancy's role in the Belizean transaction represents the first
NGO participation in a TFCA exchange.
98
The TFCA has been subject to some criticism, but remains the
United States' best legislation to enable effective EDE's. Critics charge
92 22 U.S.C. § 243 1(d)(2000)(emphasis added).
93 USAID, Bangladesh, supra note 91.
94 id.
95 See supra note 85. In 2000, the Forestry Team evaluated the causes of forest
fires in Indonesia by collecting biological and socio-economic data, then advised







that the TFCA is not "market-based, and does not benefit either
American taxpayers, foreign citizens or the environment." 99 While such
criticism may ring true regarding foreign citizens in debt for land
transactions, it cannot be maintained that debt for nature conservation
programs implemented in much of the world have not had some positive
effect on the environment and debt loads of certain countries.
C. Multilateral Debt
The majority of past EDE's have been three-party exchanges of
commercial debt or bilateral debt exchanges involving bilateral debt.1°0
As commercial and bilateral debt burdens lighten, multilateral debt
increases in significance for potential EDE's.l°1 Until recently, however,
multilateral creditors were unwilling to reduce debtor country obligations
because multilateral lenders claimed "preferred creditor status.'
0 2
Multilateral lenders support their claim to preferred creditor status
because they extend credit on concessionary terms to countries that
would otherwise lack access to financing. The IMF and World Bank in
particular argue that cancellation of multilateral debt would cripple
creditors' ability to secure financing for future lending.
°3
Recent developments have opened the possibility for EDE's
operating on multilateral debt. In 1996, the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank proposed the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative ("HIPCI") to reduce multilateral debt on a case-by-case basis.
The HIPCI represents the possibility of multilateral lending institutions
forgiving bad debt. Theoretically, forgiving multilateral debt could form
the basis for future EDE's, although no such exchanges have yet
occurred. James P. Resor, Director of Conservation Enterprises for the
United States World Wildlife Fund, claims that EDE's funded by
99 Shapiro, supra note 63 (reporting that under the EAI, Jamaican environmental
NGO's spent "$400,000 on a 'school bee project,' $569,000 on a 'motor
vehicle,' $959,000 on a 'conference' in Barbados, $1.9 million on a 'Latrine
Project (Phase I),' and $2.8 million on 'soil solarization'). However,
enforcement mechanisms in the TFCA improved on the EAI. The EAI lacked
the provision written into the TFCA subjecting grants of over $100,000 to veto
by the United States Government, 22 U.S.C. § 2431g. Furthermore, it remains
entirely possible that despite the vague descriptions, each of these expenditures
was scrutinized and legitimately authorized for specific programs.
100 See supra note 39.
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leveraging multilateral debt offers "the most significant opportunity for
the next generation of debt conversions."
10 4
D. The Kyoto Protocol
One attractive goal for EDE transactions involves the Kyoto
Protocol ("Protocol"),'0° specifically the three flexibility mechanisms:
joint implementation ("JI"), 10 6 the clean development mechanism
("CDM"), 10 7 and International Emissions Trading ("IET"). 08  Joint
implementation allows Annex B nations (countries obligated under the
Protocol to enforce emissions levels) and private-sector companies
within Annex B nations to trade emissions credits with each other on a
project-by-project basis.109 Any emissions credits traded through a JI
transaction would be subtracted from the host country's overall
emissions allocations, providing host countries with high incentive to
regulate such transactions closely. However, JI has little application to
debt-for-nature transactions because of insufficient overlap between
debtor nations eligible for EDE's and industrialized Annex-B nations.
CDM transactions also operate on an individual project level, but
CDM transactions occur between Annex B and non-Annex B nations.
110
Although the scope of CDM trading remains largely undefined, nations
are currently allowed to "bank" CDM-generated Certified Emissions
Reductions ("CER's") credits."' As such, CDM presents the highest
incentive for trading emissions credits by means of EDE's. It has been
argued that through the CDM developing nations could find financial
incentive to meet emissions standards, and thus become more amenable
to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol." 2 However, several difficulties must be
resolved before such emission trading could operate effectively.
'04 Resor, supra note 46.
105 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Changes, Dec. 10, 1977, U.N. Doc, FCC/CP.1977/b.7Add.I, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Protocol].
'06 Id. art. 6.
107 Id. art. 12.
1o8 Id. art. 16.
109 See Market-Based Mechanisms for Greenhouse Gas Abatement, at
http://www.ceeindia.org/greenhousegases/abater.htm.
1l0Id
... Nations are allowed to bank credits as of the year 2000. Id
112 See generally Sean Michael Neal, Bringing Developing Nations on Board the
Climate Change Protocol: Using Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Implement the
CleanDevelopment Mechanism, 11 GEO. INT'L. ENVT'L. L. REv. 163 (1997).
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The CDM allows an industrialized nation to apply a developing
nation's emissions reductions towards the industrialized nation's
compliance. For example, an American power plant may need to
increase its productivity from 1000 megawatts to 1500, may be bound by
emissions standards to its present level of carbon dioxide emissions.'
13
The plant operates at 40% efficiency, and it would be prohibitively
expensive to implement the technology needed to achieve the 60%
efficiency needed to generate 1500 megawatts from the same input that
now generates 1000 megawatts. A power plant in a non-Annex B
country operates at 25% efficiency. The American plant could fund a
retrofit at the developing nation's plant to raise efficiency to 40%, at a
lower cost than it would have incurred were it to retrofit its own
facilities. The lower cost results from the likelihood that fewer facilities
would need retrofitting, and the technology needed to implement
efficiency gains from 25% to 40% in a developing nation is cheaper than
what would be needed to increase efficiency from 40% to 60% in a more
developed nation.'1 4 This scenario saves the American utility money,
keeps carbon dioxide emissions constant, and improves the developing
nation's plant at no cost to the plant's owners. EDE's could provide the
funding for such retrofitting.
This idea sounds promising, but some criticize CDM
transactions because it remains possible that by selling their emissions
rights for short-term technological improvement, developing countries
risk a bleak future. This future involves stricter emissions standards, and
costlier credits in the hands of those developed nations which all along
avoided having to improve their own efficiency by partaking in CDM
transactions. A ceiling on the proportion of emissions credits gained by
CDM trading might ease this fear. Implementation and enforcement of
CDM transactions also present a valid concern. As with JI transactions,
nations may be held accountable for their private industry's CDM credit
trading.
113 This example comes from Richard Williamson, Global Emissions Trading:
Lessons from Domestic Law and Arms Control, 1996 Meeting of Am. Soc'y of
Int'l Law at 493-499 (transcript on file with University of Miami International
and Comparative Law Review).
114 According to one estimate, abatement of one ton of carbon would cost US
$25 in India, $175 in the United States, and $400 in a highly efficient nation
such as Japan. Market Mechanisms: Some Concerns, at
http://www.ceeindia.org/greenhousegases/equitr.htm.
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E. Land Reform
Like the new programs implemented in Bangladesh discussed
above, land reform serves as a long-term solution to international
environmental degradation by increasing local incentive to practice long-
term sustainable development. "'Land reform' generally means public
acquisition and redistribution of large, private, underutilized
landholdings to landless peasants as family or communal farms,
preferably with accompanying credit and technical assistance where
needed."'1 Such programs have been undertaken by numerous
countries, sometimes co-operating with American NGO's, and many
times with significant success. 1
6
By generating locally owned farms, land reform programs
provide a viable incentive for sustainable environmental development.
The new landowners are much less likely to slash and burn forests in
hopes of turning a quick profit. "[O]n any given holding, a cultivator
with ownership or an equivalent secure and permanent owner-like tenure
is far more likely to make long-term capital and 'sweat-equity'
investments that improve and conserve the land than will a cultivator
with insecure tenure." 117 The land reform option also addresses national
and indigenous sovereignty concerns associated with past EDE's by
creating a new class of secure producers more willing and able to
exercise legitimate political power in regimes currently dominated by
military force and oligopoly.
Land reform can serve as a means of strengthening democracy
and defusing the desperation that can lead to terrorism. In fact,
immediately after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, President
Kennedy's Alliance for Progress supported Latin American land reform
"to forestall rural unrest and [forcible] communist takeovers elsewhere in
Latin America." ' 8 Redistributing freeholds to private farmers can
empower previously voiceless citizens, and provide a base of capital for
local sustainable development and democracy. Grant funds established
15 Findley, supra note 5, at 23.
116 During the past thirty years several foreign governments implemented their
own land reform programs, including Columbia and Brazil. See Eitman, supra
note 4 at 23-24. Other nations have co-operated with the Seattle-based Rural
Development Institute to entitle more than seventy million families to land in
South Vietnam, the Philippines, El Salvador, Egypt, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, China,
and Moldova. See Rural Dev. Inst., 1999 Annual Report, at 7, available at
http://www.rdiland.org.
117 Roy Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform: Neglected, Yet Essential,
Rural Dev. Inst. Reports on Foreign Aid and Dev. #87 (April 1995).
118 Findley, supra note 5, at 23.
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under the TFCA could provide the means for land reform programs in
debtor countries.
However, land reform has not always been a smooth process.
Government land reform efforts in Brazil and Columbia have met with
political opposition from large landowners wary of expropriation. In
countries with a federal government system, there also exists a tension
between the centralized national power elite and the local authorities
charged with implementation. In Brazil, the federal government has
enacted legislation and created a federal agency, "INCRA," to implement
land reform. However, little public land has been effectively
redistributed. The trend has been to encourage settlement of remote
public lands, extending little technical or financial assistance. This trend
flows from the influence of large landowners, who with the help of
conservative judges have delayed and sometimes frustrated the
expropriation process.
19
For example, even though land reform is authorized by the
Article 184 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, one legal argument has
proved fatal to expropriation efforts. Article 184 allows the government
to appropriate private land "not fulfilling its social function." However,
Article 185 prevents "productive property" from being expropriated 1,2
Armed with the Article 185 exception, large landowners successfully
argue that all of their land is being used "productively," and thus cannot
be expropriated. The Brazilian legislature has not implemented summary
expropriation procedures. Colombia has experienced many of the same
problems as Brazil, also due mainly to the political and legal strength of
large landowners.
For land reform efforts to succeed, several key mechanisms
should be implemented. First, redistributed land should come from
large, privately owned, and underutilized tracts. This way, government
forests could continue to be preserved as parkland and recipients of the
redistributed tracts would not become isolated. The contracting parties
should set specific criteria to mark lands eligible for expropriation. One
method of marking land for expropriation involves setting a ceiling on
private holdings. For example, land in excess of 1000 acres may be
appropriated. This method is appealing because it facilitates a bright-line
rule. However, if a large landowner productively farms all of his 2000
acres, the injury to the landowner and the concomitant cost of
appropriation increases.
119 Findley, supra note 5, at 23-24.
120 See BRAZ. CONST. art. 185.
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Another method of marking land involves provisions similar to
those in article 184 of the Brazilian Constitution, allowing expropriation
of "underutilized" land. This method accounts for the possibility that a
large landowner farms all his land, but the definition of "underutilized"
can generate excessive debate, as the failed Brazilian and Colombian
expropriation proceedings have illustrated. The best method combines a
ceiling and a use requirement. For example, all underutilized land over
1000 acres may be appropriated.
Second, owners of expropriated land must be adequately
compensated. Compensation need not be exact market value, but should
come fairly close. EDE's can be elemental in providing a pool of money
with which landowners can be compensated. And because large farms
are subject to market forces, no asset valuation difficulties arise.
Third, local individuals and families must attain long-term
secure rights to tracts of land proportionate to their farming capabilities,
with accompanying credit extensions and technical assistance. After title
has vested, the new owners should be able to access loans, using their
land as collateral. Still, some perfunctory government financial
assistance may be necessary for the new owners to make basic first steps
to running a profitable, sustainable farm. The new owners should be
well-educated in the most proficient means of farming the particular
tract. This education could be carried out based on research by local
NGO's, indigenous tribes, or trade unions.
Most importantly, the rule of law and government authority must
be clearly defined and respected. The criteria and process for
expropriation should be carried out at the federal level, and the
implementation of the process should be carried out locally. The family
coming into possession of the redistributed tracts must have legal
assistance before, during, and after the transfer. The government and
NGO's implementing the transfers would also need assistance
developing and applying real property law.' 21 In formerly centralized
economies like China and Russia, it remains to be determined how freely
new owners may transfer or mortgage their properties. To remedy the
burgeoning tangle of legal issues which land reform programs would
create, local and regional legal aid centers need to be established.
122
121 For example, the Seattle-based Rural Development Institute assisted in
drafting a substantial portion of Kyrgyzstan's 1999 Land Code, Law on
Mortgage, Law on Cooperatives, Peasant Farm Law, and Law on Revisions to
the Civil Code. See supra note 113, at 14.
122 The Rural Development Institute founded two legal aid centers in the Russian
provinces of Vladimir and Samara. Staffed with local attorneys, by 1999 these
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If these land reform measures could be successfully written into
debt for nature transfers, the effect would not only be far more beneficial
to long-term global environmental health, but also immediately
beneficial to local and indigenous people in the debtor country.
V. Conclusion
The environmental debt exchange is a useful tool to combat
environmental destruction and foreign debt. In its earlier forms, the EDE
was subject to sovereignty, enforcement, and inflation concerns. Early
EDE's were often used to preserve parkland, but by ignoring human
quality-of-life issues in debtor countries, the conventional EDE
transaction merely glossed the surface.
More recently, EDE's have become more streamlined and
sophisticated. Environmental funds provide a steady stream of money
for conservation programs, and those programs have shifted their focus
to local populations' interaction with debtor countries' ecosystems. In
addition to the old paradigm of land preservation, the new EDE's have
been used to implement aid programs developing sustainable farming
techniques and energy efficiency. Future EDE's could fund programs to
alleviate poverty and reduce air pollution. By expanding the ends of
debt-for-nature exchanges, the destructive social trends that created the
problems of debt and environmental degradation can be more effectively
addressed and human quality of life could be improved worldwide.
centers had assisted more than 750 clients, won 12 court decisions, and
published 70 articles in local newspapers. See supra note 113, at 14.
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